

Koeberg Public Safety Information Forum (PSIF)

Minutes of the meeting held on 26 September 2013

Venue: Nuclear Auditorium, Bulk Stores, Koeberg Nuclear Power Station

Chairperson: Ms Smokie La Grange

Deputy Chairperson: Vacant

Attendees	Representative Organisation
Mr D La Grange	Resident
Mr D De Waal	Resident
Ms T Johnson	Resident
Mr K Johnson	Resident
Mrs Maigrot	Resident
Mr Maigrot	Resident
Mr R Windvogel	Resident
Mr R Williamson	Resident
Mrs MC Williamson	Resident
Mr M Meyrick	Resident
Ms C Kleynhans	Resident
Mr M Simon	Resident
Mrs S Mayhew	Resident
Mr R Mayhew	Resident
Mr D Rademeyer	Resident
Mrs A Fritz-Whyte	Resident
Mr Solomons	Resident
Officials	Designation/Organisation
Mr L Phidza	Stakeholder Management Manager – Eskom Koeberg
Mr R Bakardien	Koeberg Power Station Manager
Mr S Pienaar	Communication Officer – Eskom Koeberg
Mr S Xaso	Manager: Security & Safety – Eskom Koeberg
Mr R Makgae	National Nuclear Regulator
Mr D Nicholls	General Manager (Nuclear Engineering) - Eskom
Dr S Nhleko	National Nuclear Regulator
Dr T Hill	Programme Manager - National Nuclear Regulator
Mr G Pillay	Manager (Head): Disaster Risk Management Centre
Dr E Steyn	Head: Special Planning & Critical Infrastructure
Mr S Van Rensburg	Head: Area North – Disaster Risk Management Centre

1. Opening and welcome

The Deputy Chair welcomed everyone to the meeting.

2. Safety briefing

Ms Debbie Joshua, **Koeberg Operating Unit Senior Advisor Stakeholder Management**, conducted the safety evacuation briefing. The Chairperson emphasised the importance of all the meeting attendees completing the attendance list which was being circulated in the venue during the meeting as it is a safety and regulatory requirement.

3. The following apologies were tendered

- Ms Kim Kline
- Mr Kurt and Ms Theresa-Anne Johnson
- Mr Kurt Jurgens
- Ms Christa Kleynhans
- Mr Ian Trollope
- Mr John Iosiphakis
- Mr Phinda Siyo
- Mr Jose Pereira
- Mr Ueli Rothen
- Mr John Taylor
- Ms Marissa Jansen van Vuuren
- Mr Mike Longdon-Thurgood
- Ms Phindile Radebe

4. Acceptance of the Minutes of the Previous Meeting

The Minutes were proposed by Mr Pillay and seconded by Mr Williamson.

5. Matters arising

Comment by Mr Mayhew

The Minutes were late, which is not acceptable. As he wasn't at the previous meeting he read the Minutes with interest. In the first draft of the Minutes received quite a number of details were omitted (i.e. name of the presenter, name of the chairperson, names of resident asking a question, etc.). The Minutes were subsequently updated, however, it took close to three months to be distributed to the members, which doesn't give members enough time to comment, provide inputs or make corrections. He queried what the priority is with regard to the time frame in which the Minutes will be distributed to members to allow them sufficient time to comment or give inputs. He pointed out that at the last meeting he attended; it was promised that the Minutes would be completed within three to four weeks of the meeting for perusal and comment. It was a lot better in the past - one to two weeks before the meeting is not acceptable.

Comment by Chairperson

The Chairperson acknowledged that the timely circulation of the Minutes has been a problem, and that the issue with the names of the presenters, members and chairperson being omitted has been corrected. She also outlined the process of capturing the Minutes, conceding that those outside Eskom may not understand the challenges involved in compiling and distributing the Minutes. As the Minutes are recorded on audio tape, the person responsible for downloading the audio and preparing it for typing must ensure that the recording is clear and audible otherwise he spends more time in ensuring that it is clear and audible in order for the typist to capture the information. The typist also has to fit time into their schedule to prepare the Minutes. The Chairperson made an appeal to management to ensure that they allow the typist to focus on the Minutes for at least two days. According to the PSIF Constitution the Minutes should be available one day before the meeting, or before the meeting which is very loose. She assured the attendees that a concerted effort will be made to ensure that the Minutes are distributed three weeks to one month after the meeting.

Question by Ms Fritz-Whyte

Ms Fritz-Whyte queried whether the Minutes are sent to a specific [distribution] list because she never receives it.

Response by the Chairperson

The Chairperson in turn queried whether she is on the PSIF database.

Comment by Ms Fritz-Whyte

Ms Fritz-Whyte indicated that she assumed that when she signed the register at the last meeting, she would automatically be added to the database as she was unaware of the existence of separate databases. She was thus unsure as to whether she should be receiving the Minutes or not.

Response by the Chairperson

The Chairperson confirmed that if an individual signed in on the register, they should be receiving the Minutes, and assured Ms Fritz-Whyte that the database would be updated to reflect her details.

Comment by Mr Phidza

Mr Phidza pointed out that problems are often experienced with the audio, hence the delay in minutes. However, he reminded the members, that the minutes were sent actually more than a month ago in a draft format for members and the chairperson to review.

Comment by Mr Mayhew

Mr Mayhew requested that the draft Minutes be sent shortly after the meeting while the attendees could still remember the content, which would enable them to make comments or clarify points. He requested that the final Minutes then be distributed two weeks before the meeting. He indicated that It is a long time to expect people to remember what happened in the meeting if the minutes are received late.

Response by Mr Phidza

Mr Phidza acknowledged the challenge and informed the attendees that updated technology is being investigated to assist in the efficiency and accuracy of the minutes. He also advised the attendees that the Minutes are available on the Eskom website should anyone not receive them. Furthermore, Eskom is considering making the Minutes available on other local websites. However, he confirmed that by virtue of registering or signing in at the PSIF, members should receive the Minutes.

Comment/correction by Mr Williamson

Mr Williamson queried Mr Aploon's answer on Page 5, which states that, "*our consumption is about 250 tons per day.*" He requested a conversion of a ton of water to litres to enable him to Understand.

Response by the Chairperson

The Chairperson indicated that Mr Longden-Thurgood sent in an email query on the same issue. She indicated that the closest clarification she could provide is that a tanker holds 40 000 litres.

Response by Mr Nicholls

Mr Nicholls explained that 1 ton = 1000 litres (1 litre = 1 kg)

Comment by Mr Williamson

Mr Williamson queried another response by Mr Aploon on Page 13, "*What we will take away is to make the information more readily available to show Melkbosstrand what Eskom is doing in the Community,*" and the response by Mr Phidza which states< "*Yes, we will consider that.*" He indicated that the sentence does not make sense and needs to be reworded in the next Minutes.

Response by the Chairperson

The Chairperson stated that it would be revised and reworded in the next Minutes in order for it to make sense.

The answer by Mr Aploon should read as follows [reworded]

We will ensure that information about Eskom's donation and sponsorship initiatives in the local community are more readily available to community members.

6. Koeberg nuclear safety quarterly feedback by Mr Riedewaan Bakardien Koeberg Power Station Manager

Plant Status feedback (June – August 2013)

Unit 1

- Mr Bakardien reported that the unit has been online since 23 April 2013.
- A condenser tube leak was repaired at 50% power at the end of May 2013 – the repair took three days.
- The next outage is scheduled to take place from 11 November until 24 December 2013.

Unit 2

- Mr Bakardien reported that the unit has been online since November 2012, which is more than 300 days..
- There was a minor load reduction to effect repairs on the turbine drains recovery pump (non-nuclear).
- The next outage on this unit is scheduled to commence on 24 March 2014.
- He indicated that there is no nuclear safety concern, but that an oil leak on the Unit 2 generator is being closely monitored. 16 September 2013 saw a new station record being set with both Koeberg units at power simultaneously, beating the previous record of 147 days.

Nuclear Safety Awareness (NSA) Seminar overview (26 and 27 August):

- Mr Bakardien reported that as part of Eskom's commitment, regulatory obligation, and to enhance and strengthen nuclear safety culture, Koeberg holds an annual Nuclear Safety Awareness (NSA) Seminar. This year the seminar took place on 26 and 27 August 2013 – contractors and staff attended one of the two days. This year the theme was, "A Questioning Attitude Within the Safety Culture"
- The day is devoted to nuclear safety topics and there is a high degree of staff engagement. In addition, Koeberg staff develop and exhibit displays, which showcase their role in nuclear safety.
- Commitment to safety and to the strengthening of safety culture in an organisation is the first and vital ingredient in achieving excellent safety performance
- Nuclear safety experts from around the world were guest speakers and formed part of the discussion panel. The commitment to develop and improve Koeberg nuclear safety is also through participation in frequent international peer reviews (IAEA, WANO) and benchmarking against top nuclear stations worldwide. This looks at, amongst others things, organisational effectiveness and nuclear safety culture.

Other insights

- Mr Bakardien reported improved and more efficient diesel maintenance, with the aim of best in class diesel reliability. In addition there has been a big focus on improving the reliability of the transmission grid – both of these are to further improve nuclear safety margins.

- Visibly improved station housekeeping and material condition, after a massive drive over 12 months.
- Recent highlights include Koeberg winning the overall best performing Eskom station during the recent winter (Generation Winter Challenge), in ensuring that the lights are kept on. He reminded attendees that the electricity grid is still tight and that members of the public are requested to use electricity sparingly.
- Me Bakardien declared that the Koeberg Operating Unit achieved two million man-hours with no Lost Time Injuries, stating that this remains a key focus area for the station.
- He announced that the station is rolling out a massive training programme aimed at developing the future generation of nuclear leaders and professionals at Koeberg - this includes technical and management skills benchmarked to the best in the world. This is deemed critical as the people that built and first operated the station are now in retirement or approaching retirement age.

Question by Mr Williamson

Mr Williamson questioned whether the gas turbines feed the Koeberg plant in an emergency.

Answer by Mr Dave Nicholls

Mr Nicholls confirmed that the gas turbines can feed Koeberg. The Ankerlig High Voltage (HV) yard comes straight from the Koeberg HV yard - there are two 400Kv lines linking them. Mr Nicholls said that they can black start in approximately 25 minutes (not as quick as the Acacia turbines) and they serve as another back-up to Koeberg.

Question by Mr Mayhew

Mr Mayhew commended the training programme to develop technical skills, but questioned whether bench skills (apprenticeships and artisans) are also being taken into consideration instead of bringing in contractors.

Answer by Mr Bakardien

Mr Bakardien stated that a number of young people have been brought in as learners in the organisation in the artisan fields such as mechanical and electrical engineering. They have been trained and some of them have been appointed whilst others are still in training. Approximately 30 apprentices are on the station's books that are still working whilst being trained, although all have not been appointed. A three year built-in training programme is in place for apprentices – this is the old apprenticeship programme, however, according to the new legislation it is called learnerships. They end up becoming artisans and electricians, etc. Mr Bakardien indicated that not many want to choose this as a career path as everyone wants to be an engineer and designer. He reaffirmed that Eskom has invested a lot of effort into training them.

Question by Mr Mayhew

Mr Mayhew queried whether the Forum members could be invited to the NSA.

Response by Mr Phidza

Mr Phidza responded that some members of the Forum were invited to the 2013 Seminar in an effort to test the waters with some key members of the community. He confirmed that the plan for 2014 is to invite more members – particularly regular attendees of the PSIF.

Comment by Mr Bakardien

Mr Bakardien requested that Mr Phidza note the level of interest (with regard to the NSA) of the members for the 2014 NSA.

Answer by Mr Lewis Phidza

Mr Phidza indicated that DVDs of the 2013 NSA Seminar will be made available to PSIF members who may be interested.

7. NNR feedback on PSIF Deputy Chairperson position – Mr Gino Moonsamy (NNR)

Response by the Chairperson:

The Chairperson indicated that Mr Moonsamy was not present at the meeting and that apologies were not received from him. She stated that an email from Mr Moonsamy was sent to her via Mr Pienaar which read as follows: “NNR Feedback on the Deputy Chairperson - The information was sent late and missed the meeting so the feedback on the Deputy Chair position will be tabled at the Oct Board meeting.” The Chairperson indicated that it was an error on her part as she sent the information to Mr Moonsamy late did not make it for the last NNR meeting where the position of Deputy Chair was discussed. The Deputy Chair position will thus be tabled at the next Board meeting in October and feedback will be provided at the November PSIF meeting.

8. Progress feedback on the Traffic Evacuation Model – Mr S Nhleko

As per request by the review panel who conducted the review of the Traffic Evacuation Model of Koeberg Nuclear Power Station this is the presentation on the progress thus far.

Summary:

NNR Review Process

1. Programme manager receives submission from Holder
2. Submission assigned to Functional Area Coordinator(s)
3. Tasks assigned to specialists with relevant expertise (FCs)
4. Specialist review reports consolidated by FCs
5. Programme manager receive consolidated report(s)
6. Managers/FCs act on specialist recommendations and communicates final review finding to Holder

NNR Requirements and review basis

RD-015 Requirements (RD-015 provides for the use of a Traffic Evacuation Model)

- PAZ – 5km: 4 hours
- UPZ – 16km: 16 hours
- TEM – must be acceptable to the NNR
- **TEM comparison with Fukushima**
Koeberg:
5km radius (PAZ) – 6500 people in 3 hours or 2166 people per hour
PD = 163 people/km²

Fukushima:

2km radius – 1864 people in 2.3 hours or 800 people per hour
PD = 296.66 people/km²

Extrapolating to 5km using PD = 296.66/km² one gets:
5km radius 11650 people (in PAZ) took 14 hours to evacuate

Conclusion:

1. The NNR conducted the review of the TEM on the grounds that the TEM is part of the Koeberg Nuclear Emergency Plan, which the NNR is mandated to approve through the NNR Act.
2. The NNR however considers that the TEM (as submitted to the NNR in August 2013) is credible and can be used to estimate the overall time for evacuation of the various zones for different scenarios.
3. Approval of current TEM is subject to a resolution of longer term issues already communicated to the City/Eskom and the need to align the TEM with international guidelines.

Question by Mr Williamson

Mr Williamson queried how the 5km zone and four hours evacuation time is decided - whether it is site-related because the 5km radius in Melkbosstrand is right in the middle of the village?

Response by Mr S Nhleko

Mr Thlapo responded that it is in the regulations - a complicated analysis was used to determine an exclusion area by using certain formulae. He explained that it is a function of the power of the installation, for example, Koeberg is a 1800MW plant and if done performs the analysis, a radius around the site can be determined. He went on to explain that when the PBMR site was proposed, since it would have generated less power and if it was located at Koeberg, the exclusion zone would have been much smaller.

Comment from Mr Williamson:

Mr Williamson queried whether it was more the size of the plant than the volume of population that is taken into account.

Response by Mr Nhleko:

Mr Thlapo responded that it not a function of the size of the population.

Response by Dr Hill

Dr Hill said that a range of accidents were analysed from Koeberg and it is really a radius at which you find your earlier effects which gives way to long-term effects of radiation. 5km is a radius in which you tend to find your early effects of the accident, for example, earlier deaths versus latent cancers, which you will find further away from the plant. He re-affirmed that it has nothing to do with population.

Comment by Mr Williamson

Mr Williamson asked whether he could safely assume that it is a rough guide.

Response by Dr Hill

Dr Hill responded that it is like a speed limit – it is deemed to be a reasonable figure. Different accidents will have different effects.

Question by Ms Fritz-Whyte

Ms Fritz-Whyte commented that the 16 hours by itself gives you a limit on population so the area needs to be evacuated within 16 hours, hence there is some limit on population based on implication.

Response by Mr Nhleko

Mr Thlapo responded that it is also a function of transportation infrastructure. Assuming in an extreme case where there is infinite transport infrastructure one can argue that there will be no limit on the population.

Comment by Mr Nicholls

Mr Nicholls explained that taking the evacuation time of Cape Town Centre we know it's about two hours because we do it twice per day. So it's a function of the transport infrastructure.

Question by the Chairperson

The Chairperson queried whether the additional analysis of the 20km was done and whether the results had been received.

Response by Mr Nhleko

Mr Thlapo stated that it has been done in this review cycle.

Question by Mr Mayhew

Mr Mayhew questioned whether panic is taken into account when the times and population size are looked at.

Considering many people work in Town and their children go to schools close to Koeberg people don't know when it's serious or not when they are informed about a nuclear accident at Koeberg, so - people who work outside the area would want to come into the area to collect their children, family, and pets, particularly since the disaster in Japan.

Response by Mr Nhleko

Mr Thlapo confirmed that it has been incorporated into the model in some of the scenarios and asked that the City representative elaborate.

Response by Mr Pillay

Mr Pillay stated that it has been factored into the model and the various scenarios that could present themselves have also been considered and factored into the model.

Comment by Mr Nhleko

Mr Thlapo requested clarification with regard to the City's comment that Eskom should bear the costs, and asked whether the City referred to the financial cost of bringing the model in line with international standards and whether the City would carry the cost thereof.

Response by Mr Featherstone

Mr Featherstone commented that it is irrelevant as it is a requirement that Eskom be liable for any cost associated with the establishment of the Emergency Plan. He pointed out that the Act says that the Licence Holder has strict liability and therefore must pay.

Comment by Mr Pillay

Mr Pillay commented that the review of the Traffic Evacuation Model was not as a result of the Fukushima disaster that took place on 11 March 2011. This review that was initiated by Disaster Management commenced in 2009 already hence it was a three-year process. It was attributed to Disaster Management being concerned with the large volume of development taking place within the 0-16km EPZ (Emergency Protection Zone). As a result, all the relevant parties and departments of the City started a process to input the latest population figures and development application within the EPZ, and to remodel the TEM based on the updated information.

Question by Mr Mayhew

Mr Mayhew queried the time scale for short-and long-term.

Response by Mr Nhleko

Mr Thlapo responded that "short-term" means that the issues had to be addressed then and there for the model to be able to move forward. "Long- term" is for allowance to be made for

the City to prepare itself for what the panel deems appropriate – this may be included in the next update of the model.

“Long-term” refers to a maximum of three years, which is the maximum time allowed for the updating of the model. The long-term time scale has to be discussed between the City and the review panel.

Question by Mr Mayhew

Mr Mayhew questioned how long the review has been underway.

Response by Mr Nhleko

Mr Thlapo stated that the first one started in 2006, it was updated in 2010, and this review was performed in 2012.

Response by Mr Pillay

Mr Pillay clarified that initially there was no stipulation other than reviews had to be performed regularly.

Response by Mr Nhleko

Mr Thlapo stated that the NNR is putting times to it because they recognise it as a loophole in the system – it is still under discussion because there could be a situation where Eskom or the City has no resources and we can't make the deadline.

Question by Mr Mayhew

Mr Mayhew asked what the NNR's response would be to that kind of statement.

Response by Mr Nhleko

Mr Thlapo stated that the licence would be withdrawn.

Comment by Mr Nicholls

Mr Nicholls said that when practicing their Emergency Plan prior to Fukushima, the Japanese were informed by their station manager that it was just a drill and that it would never really happen. He stated that the degree of seriousness in the emergency plan was actually appalling as, in fact, they had no emergency plan, which is evidenced by the fact that they evacuated everybody up to 30km as opposed to only the zones affected. The instruction came from the president, not the power station. The final evacuation in Japan didn't start until after a day or more.

Question by Mr Mayhew

Mr Mayhew asked whether the public has access to the findings from the NNR study.

Response by Dr Hill

Dr Hill stated that the progress presented is regarded as the feedback to the public.

Comment by Chairperson

The Chairperson requested that updated feedback about the TEM be provided at the next meeting.

Question by Mr Williamson

Mr Williamson queried whether the information is available on the website and whether the presentation could be emailed to the members.

Comment by Chairperson

The Chairperson indicated that the presentation would be made available with the Minutes of the meeting.

Comment by Mr Phidza

Mr Phidza stated that the presentations are usually summarised in the Minutes, so it would be included in the Minutes, however if members want the full presentations to be forwarded to them as well, they can indicate so.

Response by the Chairperson

The Chairperson stated that the Forum would like the full presentation and not a summarised version.

Comment by Mr Phidza

Mr Phidza stated that the full presentation would be forwarded to the together with the Minutes.

9. Latest update on Fukushima – Mr Dave Nicholls

Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission

"What must be admitted – very painfully – is that this was a disaster 'Made in Japan.' Its fundamental causes are to be found in the ingrained conventions of Japanese culture: our reflexive obedience; our reluctance to question authority; our devotion to 'sticking with the program'; our groupism; and our insularity."

*Kiyoshi Kurokawa – Chairman of Commission
July 2012*

Question by Mr Mayhew

Mr Mayhew asked whether the Fukushima Units 1 to 4 still have all the rods in them.

Response by Mr Nicholls

Mr Nicholls responded that they still have all their rods in them as no fuel has been removed.

Question by Mr Mayhew

Mr Mayhew queried whether there will be a threat of radiation to the public when these rods are drilled.

Comment by Mr Nicholls

Mr Nicholls stated that it is exactly the same as Koeberg moving spent fuel rods from the fuel pool into spent fuel casks and that the process is well understood - it is a normal process which forms part of normal plant design. They will do the same thing on Unit 1 and 3, and eventually Unit 2. He said that this cannot be done at present due to the radiation field in the area, which makes working there very difficult.

Comment by Mr Featherstone

Mr Featherstone pointed out that none of the fuel in fuel pool was damaged so they are moving normal fuel. However, the fuel in the reactors on Unit 1, 2 and 3 are damaged, and if they move that it will be another issue.

Mr Williamson

Mr Williamson asked how an area is decontaminated.

Response by Mr Nicholls

Mr Nicholls responded that decontamination entails people physically going down with hoses washing down walls, washing down chemicals, removing topsoil, etc, and commented that it is a really big job.

Question by Mr Mayhew

Mr Mayhew asked whether washing things down doesn't result in it going into the soil, and queried how long it takes for the spoil to decay.

Response by Dave Nicholls

Mr Nicholls stated that dumps - like mine dumps - are established. Although contaminated, it will be fenced off and controlled. He explained that the dominant nuclide is Cesium 137 with a half-life of 30 years so it would take about 100 years to decay.

Question by Mr Mayhew

Mr Mayhew asked whether the containment is whole or smashed.

Response by Mr Nicholls

Mr Nicholls responded that it is not smashed but that there might be holes in it. He stated that the general structure is stable and that the melting of the core did not compromise the integrity of the structure.

Question by Mr Williamson

Mr Williamson stated that Germany closed half their reactors and asked what their position is and how they would get their power if all their reactors are shut down.

Question by Mr Nicholls

Mr Nicholls responded by saying that there are very good studies looking at renewables but that there are two problems: you have to keep conventional power stations, for example nuclear and coal) in service in case renewables don't work. They require all fossil power stations to be ready the day the wind is not blowing. He confirmed that they want to mothball all their stations but stated that big conventional power stations like Koeberg are not meant to shut down and start up twice a day.

10. General:

Comment by Mr Meyrick

Mr Meyrick suggested that someone should specify who pays for what, for example, consultants for the meetings and their flights.

Response by Mr Nicholls

Mr Nicholls commented that Koeberg pays the NNR a license fee, and by law, flight costs relating to the Emergency Plan are paid for by Eskom.

Question by Mr Mayhew

Mr Mayhew queried what Koeberg has done with regard to improving safety specifically related to security and asked whether the threat of terrorism has been taken into account. He queried whether Koeberg is not opening itself up to being a soft target – the Kenya incident proved that this is a serious threat. He asked whether a specialist with knowledge on terrorism would be brought in to look at how the situation can be improved in terms of implementing certain safeguards. He maintained that it has to come from an external source who deals with this kind of threat.

Response by Mr Bakardien

Mr Bakardien responded that Koeberg does a complete assessment of all security risks on a routine basis for the nuclear power station, so all the potential risks are understood. He explained that counter-measures are put in place to deal with the different risks but acknowledged that it is different for South Africa than other countries in that the counter-measures are in place to ensure readiness for those risks. He stated that there is awareness that the threat changes on regular basis and having seen what took place in Kenya, there is a need to reassess the risks in terms of whether there is an increased risk and also whether our borders are becoming increasingly porous (which increases the risk). He explained that this is all part of the assessment of risk and that the station works with a host of international agencies who are in that field.

Comment by Mr Featherstone

Mr Featherstone commented that following 9/11, there has been a significant focus on the security of nuclear installations worldwide. In the same way that WANO looks at the operations of power stations, there is another institution that has been established nationally with the purpose of looking at the security of nuclear installations across the world. He stated that Koeberg has people who have gone to many of conferences, which afford the latest understanding of what is considered to be good nuclear security, and it takes into account terrorism aspects. He explained that because of the bombs that went off during construction of Koeberg, the security has been structured in a way that focusses on the terrorism threat. However, he stated that no nothing significant has been found that required changes to be made.

Question by Mrs Mayhew

Mrs Mayhew asked whether the first check point from the West Coast Road has been done away with as they were not required to sign in on the evening of the PSIF. She stated that they were allowed through after indicating that they were attending the PSIF.

Response by Mr Featherstone

Mr Featherstone responded that that area is not part of the National Keypoint - it is merely an entry point into the Owner Controlled Area (the external perimeter). He stated that security is focussed on the area around Koeberg itself, which is part of the National Keypoint.

Comment by Mr Bakardien

Mr Bakardien explained that there is a graded approach to getting onto the site and even before entering the National Keypoint which is where the plant is, there is an area (Access Point 1) where identification is required and where permitry is required.

Question by Mrs Mayhew

Mrs Mayhew asked how far one can go before being checked.

Response by the Mr Bakardien

Mr Bakardien responded that one can go to the top of the hill.

Response by the Chairperson

The Chairperson added that that is just past the Koeberg Visitors Centre.

Comment by Mr Xaso (Koeberg Security Manager)

Mr Xaso added that there is international support in terms of security support training and benchmarking, and that information is also shared. He stated that he attended training in New Mexico in 2012. With regard to terrorism, he informed the attendees that the DoE, State Security Agency, and SAPS have round table discussions to review the threat to the country and to nuclear. The National Keypoint Act regulates us to ensure that Koeberg is adequately protected since it is a National Keypoint. Mr Xaso stated that in terms of security Koeberg is on par with international standards and regular reports are received. He pointed out Koeberg is aware of what direct and indirect threats are and has mitigations for them.

11. Date of the next meeting:

The date of the next meeting is 28 November. It will take place at 19:00 at the Koeberg Nuclear Auditorium, Bulk Stores.

12. Agenda points for next meeting:

- Senior Implementers (SAPS, ambulance) to address members on their role in the EP Plan
- PSIF Deputy Chairperson update

13. Closure:

The PSIF meeting was adjourned at 21:02.

Abbreviation/Definition list

Abbreviation	Description	Abbreviation	Description
KNPS	Koeberg Nuclear Power Station	CoCT	City of Cape Town
KOU	Koeberg Operating Unit	IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
NNR	National Nuclear Regulator	DOC	Disaster Operations Centre
KPSIF	Koeberg Public Safety Information Forum	SABC	South African Broadcasting Corporation
ISO	International Standards Organisation	mSv	Millisieverts
PSM	Power Station Manager	EP	Emergency Plan
SAPS	South African Police Service	UPZ	Urgent Protective Action Planning Zone
MW	Megawatts	Emergency	An event that requires taking prompt action, or the special regulation of persons or property, to limit the risk to people's health, safety or welfare, or to limit damage to property or the environment
ECC	Emergency Control Centre	Evacuation	The rapid, temporary removal of people from the area to avoid or reduce short-term radiation exposure in the event of an emergency
Emergency Plan	A document describing the organisational structures, its roles and responsibilities, concept of operation, means and principles for intervention during an emergency	Plant	Nuclear Power Station with associated components, machinery, equipment or devices

Abbreviation/Definition list

Abbreviation	Description	Abbreviation	Description
Public Notification	Notification to the public of an emergency and the appropriate protective actions to be taken by using the installed siren and loudspeaker system, as well as local authorities, local radio and television station.	Radiation	Energy released in the form of particles or electromagnetic waves during the breakdown of radioactive atoms.
Release	The controlled or accidental discharge of radioactive substances into the environment	Sheltering	A protective action whereby members of the public stay indoors with windows and doors closed, to reduce their exposure to radioactive material in an emergency situation.
Accident	An unintended event, including operating errors, equipment failures or other mishaps.	Disaster Management	A continuous and integrated multi-sectoral, multi-disciplinary process of planning and implementation of measures aimed at: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Preventing or reducing the risk of disaster b) Limiting the severity or consequences of disasters c) Emergency preparedness d) Responding rapidly and effectively to disaster; and e) Post-disaster recovery and rehabilitation
FCs	Functional Co-ordinators	EPSOC	Emergency Planning Steering and Oversight Committee
TEM	Traffic Evacuation Model	SAMGs	Severe Accident Management Guidelines
EPZ	Emergency Planning Zone	UPZ	Urgent Protective Action Zone
PAZ	Precautionary Action Zone		